**The Psychology of Theft and Loss: Stolen and Fleeced**
By Robert Tyminski  
$40.78

**American Soul: A Cultural Narrative**
By Ronald Schenk  
$27.95

Reviewed by Kathryn Staley

Two recent books, *The Psychology of Theft and Loss* by Robert Tyminski and *American Soul* by Ronald Schenk, explore the psychological roots of our engagement with and greed for material objects. Tyminski writes about the interpersonal and intra-psychic level of the theft while Schenk looks at compulsive acquisitiveness as an element of the soul of America.

Theft is a topic that occurs and recurs in our clinical sessions. Clients shoplift, attempt to steal our time and our lives, mourn what has been stolen from them in life, or evade mourning. Robert Tyminski has written a compelling book on the types of theft in his clinical practice and the theoretical underpinnings of that theft. He extends our engagement with the topic in an archetypal discussion using the myths of Jason and Medea. Tyminski uses these two myths to build an archetypal reference point for his subsequent case studies and thoughts on theft in the treatment room.

Tyminski sees Jason as the product of a power-hungry, ruthless family history—an intergenerational dynamic that Jason reenacts with Medea. Jason is not the hero of
contemporary interpretation, but an adolescent attempting to steal back what has been lost and what he feels entitled to by conniving with others or sweet-talking them. The theft of the Golden Fleece, engineered by Medea, conflicts with the pursuit of individuation because his passage has been a destructive and reckless journey based on deprivation and envy. The myth of Jason and Medea is an example of a theft that escalates to violence and destruction and fails to heal the wound that promotes the theft.

Tyminski grounds his discussion of theft in a wide range of theoretical understanding—from Freud to Jung, from Klein to Winnicott, as well as contemporary cognitive research. Winnicott viewed antisocial acts as behavior attempting to communicate early deprivation, thus prospectively hopeful because the thief is seeking help and relationship. Jung’s belief in integrating shadow also suggests that theft is purposive, an effort to right an imbalance or bring shadow material to consciousness.

The depth and breadth of Tyminski’s clinical experience gives us a broad lens to view the shifting emotional kaleidoscope that compels people to steal. He offers us examples of thieving children, kidnapping, shoplifting, and techno-theft. The case studies show a range of responses from the therapist, as Tyminski chronicles his work with thieving clients and models for us a non-judgmental, attuned response.

Tyminski’s chapter on stealing in the consulting room thoughtfully discusses theft in the transference. He identifies illusion as an essential part of analysis because it allows the client “to symbolize important aspects of his or her life, giving the person an ability to dream them in creative ways” (p. 133). Theft is the concretization of fantasy, thus destructive to the ability to explore illusion. The transference, he says, is based on illusion and, therefore, the desire to steal something from the analyst is an important building block in the analytic relationship. The lust for the desired object can represent clients’ need to steal what they did not get in early attachment—the unattainable Golden Fleece. The Fleece represents enormous pent-up longing—an essential component to be excavated in depth analysis. If that longing is explored in the transference and countertransference within the containing analytic space, overwhelming desires can be integrated. The theft becomes Promethean, an act to shed light, rather than a violent, fixated response.

Tyminski gives us several excellent examples from his practice, one a case of erotic transference where the client was able to take back her projection about a romantic relationship with the analyst. “Locating a Fleece archetype within a transference dream,” he tells us, “orients the analyst to the unspoken edges of the existing transference relationship” (p. 143). The analyst provides the perspective of a concerned parent, and that allows the client to view the Fleece, see the dragon, and choose to leave the ideal object under the tree—an experience dramatically different from Jason’s quest.

In the book’s last chapter “Our Internal Thief” Tyminski identifies the thief as a complex existing in our unconscious. The “internal thief” represents our own inner urge to steal an ephemeral desired object. Jason was passive and incompetent and stole only with the help of Medea’s craftiness and skill. The Jason-Medea pair of opposites exists in all of us—the thoughtless adolescent urgency and the competent expertise. The desire for theft can contribute to growth when the transference relationship allows the client to unearth and view the Golden Fleece. Negative outcomes, Tyminski says, are usually related to a failure to process loss, whether in an actual relationship or something that is longed for. The “internal thief” is the regulator that pushes us to repair the loss either by avoiding or by assisting in growth. Since stealing is always a crime against relationships because theft destabilizes trust and violates boundaries, the “internal thief” can try to
assuage loss when he “steals our ability to communicate with ourselves” (p. 175) and prohibits exploration. “Consciousness about what our internal thief has to offer,” Tyminski counsels us, “could counter restrictive outcomes by providing us with some of the thief’s resourcefulness: a good dose of shrewd cleverness, a healthy respect for selfishness and an appreciation that thieving is everywhere—even part of nature” (p. 176).

Tyminski believes that this “internal thief” encourages the ability to feel gratitude by intervening when we feel stolen from and, therefore, reestablishes equilibrium. When we become intimate with the thief in our unconscious, we allow ourselves to begin to accept our longing for what we have lost. Tyminski shows himself a true Jungian wrestling with the opposites heroically and looking for prospective growth in shadow.

The myth of Jason and Medea is a cautionary tale about, among other things, unmediated early trauma and abandonment that leads to an inflated, reactive response that can contribute to more trauma and dislocation. Medea is swept into Jason’s vortex of desire from her own position of neglect. In the absence of relationship, love, and gratitude, she enacts the horror on her progeny. The myth is a timely story of sequenced intergenerational trauma and the failure to stop the spinning gyroscope. The analytic container offers potential mediation and excavation of the unprocessed emotion buried in psyche that leads to huge longing and desire for the Fleece. Tyminski’s book asks us to reflect on these questions: What do we do with the longing? How does the desired object explain the old loss? How can we use the antisocial act to assist in building a healing relationship?

One of the pleasures of reading The Psychology of Theft is that Tyminski engages our discriminatory sense to review the examples in our practices with new eyes. Stealing is central to the human condition but not much written about and certainly not in such an encompassing manner. Tyminski provokes discussion and offers his experience and thoughts about how to interact with theft in our clients and psyches.

Ronald Schenk’s American Soul is about theft and greed, too, and how those qualities relate to the American ideal. His book is a compelling discussion of the founding myth of America, which follows the chain of historical influence beginning with the Judeo-Christian and Puritan inception through Benjamin Franklin and Alexander Hamilton to Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Ronald Reagan. He discusses the identification with Puritan fundamentalism, as well as the Founding Fathers’ penchant for material success, and tracks those characteristics through subsequent centuries with writers, politicians, and financial underpinnings to arrive at a sense of the underlying aspects of the country in order to identify a national character.

The real thrust of Schenk’s thesis is the failure of contemporary American culture to acknowledge the shadow side of the myth—the terrorist intent to enforce the American viewpoint on the world. His prose communicates his passion for the subject and frustration with the lack of awareness and continued worsening plight. His book is not a pat answer or analysis, but the beginning of a discussion of our national heritage in Jungian terms. What is our myth and how does it contribute to our current health and welfare?

In some areas, the book reads like a sweeping indictment rather than a balanced discussion. The financial crises that are mainstays of the author’s analysis have certainly been cyclical occurrences in the larger world of finance for centuries and are not solely indigenous to the American character. The acquisition of assets and power has dominated the history of the world, as have the rise and fall of empires.

Schenk thoughtfully provides his own understanding of American cultural and
political history so that we can begin to assess the myth that has led us to “blind self-interest, a privileging of an elite section of the population, rampant racism, devouring consumerism, the plundering of energy and natural resources, capitalistic exploitation … and the continuous reversion to military action for the sake of dominance” (p. xiii). *American Soul* promotes thought about where we have come from and where we are headed by bringing shadow to the forefront of the American character.

Tyminski uses Mandeville’s *Fable of the Bees* to suggest that stealing and envy might be important drivers in economic systems. Schenk has a less constructive viewpoint about the nature of acquisitive passion, at least for Americans. We can certainly agree that entitlement, loss, and envy which result in theft are universal phenomena, and that the sociological landscape may provoke our greed and be another aspect of our attempt to assuage the ineffable longings that can block individuation. Both authors give us their thoughtful, well-reasoned viewpoints on the symbolic nature of acquisition and materialism, a discussion important to our practices of psychoanalysis as well as our understanding of the world.

*Kathryn Staley, M.A., M.B.A, L.P.,* is a licensed Jungian analyst practicing in New York City and East Hampton. She is a graduate of the C. G. Jung Institute of New York and the author of books and articles on the financial markets.

**Lament of the Dead: Psychology after Jung’s Red Book**
By James Hillman and Sonu Shamdasani
New York: W. W. Norton, 2013, 246 pages, $27.95

Reviewed by Ronald Schenk

**Cast of Characters:**
*The Red Book: Liber Novus (TRB)—Star of the Show*
*C.G. Jung—midwife to The Red Book*  
*James Hillman—eminent Jungian analyst and “son” of Jung*
*Sonu Shamdasani—eminent Jungian historian and “son” of Jung*  
*Sonu Shamdasani—eminent Jungian editor and “cell mate” of Jung*  
*Ghost of Freud—“father” of Jung*  
*The Reviewer—“grandson” of Freud and Jung*

In the period of October 1913 through February 1914, a time when he had completed his ground-breaking work, *Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido* (CW 5), C. G. Jung was living with the after-effects of the rupture of his relationships with Sigmund Freud and Sabina Spielrein and experiencing Europe on the verge of cultural, artistic, and political chaos. He went through an intense introspective experience of dreams and fantasies involving several characters with mythical qualities, an event which signaled a turning point in his career. He responded to these expressions of his unconscious life through a process in which he actively interacted with them through imaginative dialogue and which he recorded, first in handwritten drafts, later in typed pages, and finally in calligraphy with associated painting—a process which lasted about sixteen years. The resulting work came to be called “The Red Book.” Jung put the project aside in 1930 in favor of his studies in alchemy, picked it up again briefly in 1959, but eventually left it unfinished before his death in 1961. In 1996 Jungian historian Sonu Shamdasani began a project of publishing *The Red Book*, and in 1999 put forth a proposal that was subsequently accepted by the Jung family. In 2000 Shamdasani and his colleagues set to work on a translation and edited version of the book that was true to the original form in which Jung had created it. The final product, published in 2009, has
proved to be a great success in its reception by both the Jungian world generally and the public at large.

_The Lament of the Dead_ is a series of conversations between Shamdasani and Jungian analyst and writer, James Hillman. The reviewer regards Hillman, who died in 2011, shortly before _Lament_ was published, as the most original and prolific thinker in depth psychology directly influenced by Jung. His originality lay in his ability to take the form and content of Jung’s thought and “see through” it to its essential features. Foremost among these is his sense of the dominant thrust of Jung’s work as the elucidation of the unique nature of the psyche and its own particular mode of expression.

The conversations are accessible and amiable in tone, a dialogue between two friends who are scholars with similar perspectives on their subject. This medium is not only a familiar one for Hillman, but also reflects the dialogical form of its subject matter. The discussions focus first on a line from _The Red Book_, “lament of the dead”: “Then turn to the dead, listen to their lament and accept them with love,”1 which the authors see as capturing the essence of the book, but also pointing out directions for psychology “after _The Red Book._” Second, the conversations emphasize that _The Red Book_ provides a model for an understanding of the language of the psyche as primarily imagistic. For Shamdasani, an appreciation of _TRB_ as Jung’s “foundational text …[giving] contingency” (p. 37) to the rest of his work, while documenting his “descent into human ancestry” (p. 2) and grappling with “the weight of human history” (p. 38), would give Jungian psychology the opportunity to “recover its soul” (p. 159).

Already we can hear an inflationary tone to the language, as it essentially follows the valorizing quality that Jung and Aniela Jaffe gave to his autobiography, _Memories, Dreams, Reflections_. This sensibility can be seen in the title of the book, where it is assumed that proper understanding of the import of _TRB_ should bring about change in the entire field of psychology. In this vein, Shamdasani and Hillman use the dialogue to put forth their own agendas as alternately set up by the other in a repetitive fashion. Shamdasani’s agenda seems to be to present Jung as a Titan bringing the light of psychological life to psychology and psychotherapy, whereas Hillman’s agenda appears to be using _TRB_ to reiterate all the salient points he made in his career, questioning several aspects of Jung’s thought that he views as inconsistent with Jung’s most profound insights and attacking post-Jungian discourse that misses these insights.

This reviewer would suggest that the dialogue between Shamdasani and Hillman is strongest in those sections where their agendas help to clarify Jung’s thought and its evolution. In these, it is as if the two are replicating Jung’s dialogue with the figures in his unconscious, each playing the role of “Jung” to the other as “Philemon,” or “the soul.” To begin with, the choice of emphasizing Jung’s characterization of the unconscious as “the dead” is a helpful counter to the optimistic redemption that Jungians often associate with the realization of the unconscious. They see “the dead” through Jung’s eyes as the expression of “human history” in the sense of the archetypal nature of the collective unconscious. They emphasize the importance of the tension (mine/not mine, each within the other) that Jung held between the personal manifestations and the collective dynamics of archetypal forms in the creation of a “personal cosmology” (p. 143), which Jung pioneered in the field of psychology, and make the salient point that Jung’s experience indicates the “porous permeability” (p. 25) between notions of “the living” and “the dead.” Both are there, simultaneously together and always. What feels like our own deepest conflicts are manifestations of interplay between unconscious powers. A final stress is upon Jung’s indication that ad-
dressing the dead and their needs is the greatest of psychological moral imperatives.

The dialogue also clarifies the sense of a language that is most appropriate to the psyche that emerges from TRB. Whereas Hillman asserts that Jung “failed” in sticking with the aesthetic mode of TRB, i.e., to dialogue through imagination with the various voices that the psyche presents, Shamdasani modulates, showing that Jung was in his own process of working his way out of the influence of the conceptual medico/scientific world from which he started to a “lyrical elaboration” (p. 9) of the contents of the psyche. Although Jung reverted to conceptual expression after TRB, Shamdasani notes that ultimately concepts are themselves images.

Together the two assert that when image is given its rightful psychological priority over concept, as Jung does in TRB, one’s sense of “I” as central is undermined by a multiplicity of voices that emerge from “the dead,” namely other aspects of the psyche than those one knows or is accustomed to. With an imagistic sensibility, “I” becomes one among many and therefore relieved of the sense of personal isolation and responsibility that ego-centered psychology based in Jungian concepts engenders. The ensuing dialogue allows for meeting “phenomena as they appear” (p. 11), a sensibility to the “immediacy” (p. 9), and the “flesh” (p. 104) of experience and an articulation within its own terms. It gives rise to an awareness of the “fullness of life” (p. 21) without an appeal to the transcendent. Both see the tendency of the Jungian world to base itself in Jung’s concepts (such as anima, ego, self, individuation) as a collective misappropriation of language, a “guardrail” (p. 72) keeping consciousness distanced from an encounter with the “depths” (p. 181) of experience, which the model of TRB can potentially correct. Finally, Shamdasani reminds us that the “signature trait” (p. 107) of TRB is that Jung’s differentiation of many voices allowed him to dis-identify with any one voice and maintain a constant state of reflection, while Hillman stresses that Jung’s use of imagistic language allows for the primary mode of psychological life, that of a vigilant “seeing through” to the metaphorical nature of appearance.

As with Jung’s concepts, Hillman struggles with the Christianity in Jung and especially with the Christianization of Jungian psychology by his followers. Hillman has no time for the reversion to transcendence and “process” as “progress” (p. 134) toward a goal that the notion of individuation implies. He believes that the immediacy of experience in image holds its own intentionality, its own teleology, its own center, its own totality, its own redemption, and that goals can only give impetus and are ever receding.

Again, Shamdasani, the historian, contextualizes this major influence in Jung’s thought. He sees TRB, with Christ as critical figure, as Jung’s struggle to come to terms with Christianity, in essence his attempt to formulate his own “religion,” which is a psychology calling for the necessity of addressing the “powers.” “God” becomes “Gods,” each with its own unconsciousness, its own dark side, and its own contra-sexual side. Christianity in its Gnostic form infuses Jung’s psychology of religion through a revitalization of the symbol-forming function, the meaning given to suffering, the opening up to the natural man, and the sense that the human “process . . . finds its ultimate sanction and meaning and import in the process of divine self-revelation” (p. 94)—all of which Hillman sees as more concretely and immediately available through the sensibility to image.

Shamdasani acts in the roles of editor and historian simultaneously. In each role he offers a helpful context. As editor he makes clear that Jung’s project was sixteen years in the making with various versions
of the text to consider. He testifies to the difficulty in determining issues, such as chronology, and links the text to previous work, such as Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido (CW 5) and the use of mythology, and to future work, such as Aion and how the notion of “The Way” in TRB would evolve into the more conceptual notion of individuation. As historian Shamdasani makes clear his opinion that Jung was not in a condition of “breakdown” in the months the material for TRB came to him, but was doing his work with his patients, spending time with his family, performing his service in the army, etc. Shamdasani provides a cultural context for TRB, a sense of the artistic world that Jung knew, and information about precursors such as Blake, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche. Finally, Shamdasani emphasizes the tension under which Jung was struggling between a conceptual and an imagistic mode of expression, resulting in the emergence of active imagination as technique, and the ethical sensibility that Jung placed on the idea of consciously meeting and addressing imaginal figures.

In spite of the contributions Shamdasani provides in his two roles, the reviewer would suggest that this dual relationship presents a conflict of interest between the editor and the historian. As editor, he needed to identify with Jung as much as possible, making himself Jung’s “cell mate in a prison” (p. 156), seeing himself as taking up Jung’s great unfinished work and becoming a spokesman for Jung. Under the influence of this identification, as historian, Shamdasani tends to idealize Jung and follow Jung’s romanticized sense of his own process as a solitary heroic descent to meet the ancestors and bring back the treasure of their expression, essentially validating Jung’s self-image as a “shaman, the medicine man of the West” (p. 63). Similarly, Jung is depicted as something of a prophet, with his internal imagery of floods of blood anticipating the coming World War. In analyzing the tension Jung felt between conceptual language and the imagistic, Shamdasani presents Jung as deliberately “eschew[ing]” the former, which had “left him empty” (p. 193). TRB is then presented as “Jung one hundred percent proof” (p. 141), his foundational text, not only because it indicates the widest range of themes in Jung’s work, but because it most purely presents his aesthetic sensibility as the most psychological means of giving expression to the depths of experience. Finally, no mention is made of the fact that TRB emerged in the aftermath of ruptures in two of the most significant relationships in Jung’s life: his splits with Freud and Spielrein. One can readily surmise that these losses must have brought about severe and long lasting emotional effects in Jung, as suggested by his repeated references to sacrifice and suffering in TRB, as well as his letters of that time. Further, the turn in Jung’s psychology to one that largely ignores personal development and the reductive analysis of complexes, which is the touchstone of most good contemporary dynamic psychotherapy and psychoanalysis, would have to be seen in light of Jung’s need to separate himself from Freud and establish his own ground, as opposed to having “no need of psychodynamics, of developmental psychology” (p. 88).

The reviewer would suggest that although Shamdasani is right in noting the many aspects of Jung’s thought contained in TRB, he is misguided in designating it as Jung’s “foundational” (p. 37) work. It is his most purely and personally imagistic work, and the aesthetic mode is his major contribution to depth psychology, yes, but Jung’s conceptual mind would always be a crucial part of his opus. His writings on alchemy would be more representative of his integration of the rational and irrational, conceptual and imagistic, and thus displaying his most sustained mindfulness. Although parts of TRB are sublimely poetic or profoundly thoughtful, other sections are repetitive, mundane or pedantic, as one would expect.
from a journal no matter how often it had been revised, even over sixteen years. The reviewer would suggest that there are many “Jungs” and that one phrase, sentence, paragraph, essay or book can be considered “foundational” depending on the “Jung” one has in mind. The quest for an adequate language of the psyche has always been depth psychology’s--Freud’s and Jung’s--mission, and to make TRB the epitome of psychological expression is misleading. Shamdasani the editor has made an enormous contribution to Jungian scholarship, but he has also limited Shamdasani the historian, who has presented us with a constrained picture of Jung, that which Jung would have wanted us to have.

And here, following his evaluation of Shamsdasani’s stances in TRB the reviewer steps aside, and the “Ghost of Freud” enters the dialogue, opening the door to an assessment of Hillman’s role and perspective.

Hillman’s denigration through the device of distortion and caricature of contemporary psychotherapy derives from my (Freud’s) ideas, and his use of TRB to validate his own therapy is also misguided. “Seeing through” Jung’s and my psychologies allows us to see that they actually complement each other, each focusing on different aspects of psychological life which are always present and interpenetrating each other. My therapy is closer to a healing process, while Jung and Hillman’s “therapy” is a personal cosmology-creating device that interested them more than therapy per se. The authors point out that Jung suggested psychotherapy before seeing me, as the following points illustrate:

1) Listening to “the lament of the dead” is the agenda of all depth psychology, including psychoanalysis, which refers to the dead as “the repressed.” Hillman’s statement that “the past is the soul” is the statement of all depth psychology, and his descriptions of the dead as “all that’s been,” “what I have missed” (p. 177), is precisely what psychoanalytic psychotherapy is focused upon. Yes, Jung sees the dead one or two levels deeper (the “profound personal” and the collective unconscious, but, as I will show, this view is always contingent upon the influence of the personal unconscious. Shamdasani notes that “the dead are already here” (p. 227) and that “the living can be answered, or addressed only through attending to the dead” (p. 175), a contingency which Jung ignores and Hillman denigrates.

The psychoanalytic method of free association that Hillman maligns actually is closer to the phenomenology that he praises than Jung’s, and his technique of active imagination, is in fact a system imposed by the analyst, which he describes as if it were free association: “all kinds of whacky thoughts” (p. 85), “anything that comes into the mind, however trivial, disgusting, vast. Every ‘nonstarter’ is a potential starting image, feeling, or idea” (p. 168). In fact, the first things that come to mind are the day’s residues and vestiges of family experience that Hillman degrades.

To go directly for the archetypal or the profoundly personal, as Hillman, following Jung, advocates, misses the fact that any “story” that comes out of this will be in service to the complex which is governing it. The defenses related to personal trauma or family history that Hillman wants to exclude and exile are precisely the first authors of the story that need to be reckoned with. Stories don’t change through active imagination in a lasting way. The deconstruction of personal narrative through a reductive analysis allowing for the integration of deeply seeded feelings associated with complexes giving rise to a realignment of personality structure is the genuine transformative therapeutic process that allows for a
more authentic personal cosmology.

4) Turning therapy into a form of instruction through applying techniques such as active imagination misses the fundamental point that both Jung and Hillman make: “the basic activity of psychic life . . . [is a matter of] fantasy making” (p. 42); all “reality” is a created image. Psychodynamic psychotherapy and analysis start with an analysis of how the patient has created his or her reality, self-destructive as it might be, as a protective response to painful feelings engendered by scripts imposed from the past by significant others. Here Shamdasani and Hillman make a very important point: Jung’s version of analysis is not a therapeutic process per se, rather it is a process of creating a meaning-centered personal psychology. If Jung’s sense is that suffering comes from loss of meaning, his method only provides a surface shift without touching the centrally influential affective component.

5) In advocating the instruction of active imagination, both Jung and Hillman miss the power and aesthetic dynamics going on between doctor and patient—but which Jung describes so beautifully in *The Psychology of the Transference*-the transference/countertransference, which is the most immediate source of “story” or “image” available to both. The patient is simply giving himself or herself over to the analyst’s directions (trying to replicate experience in the patient, telling stories to the patient, etc.), inevitably connected to the analyst’s own emotional needs. This in turn, gives rise to further boundary crossings by the analyst as director/instructor/mentor/guide of the patient.

6) The goal of psychodynamic therapy and analysis is the same as that Hillman professes in his treatment: to keep the patient in dialogue, to re-imagine the sense of “personal,” to imagine every conscious moment through the capacity for “seeing through” to the metaphorical sensibility of experience, to sense the present as animated by the past, to enter into the inner and outer personal drama as one of many characters, to make permeable the distinction between self and other, to sense the Gods as “larger than” entities at work and play in individual and collective experience, and to realize the process itself as goal. In this way, with their initial focus on childhood and family, psychodynamic psychotherapy and analysis would be seen not as a cultural trap, as Hillman views them, but as a cultural mode of realizing the myth of “the eternal return” that pervades experience universally.

7) *The Lament of the Dead?* You can’t imagine a more Freudian book!

Notes


2 A response to Sonu Shamdasani’s comment on *The Red Book* in *Lament of the Dead*: “You couldn’t imagine a less Freudian book” (p. 100).

Ronald Schenk, Ph.D., is a Jungian analyst practicing in Dallas and Houston. He is a past president of The Inter-Regional Society of Jungian Analysts and President-Elect of the Council of North American Societies of Jungian Analysis. He writes on clinical and cultural issues and the most recent of his books is *American Soul: A Cultural Narrative*. 